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Abstract—The one time pad (OTP) secure transmission relies
on the random keys to achieve perfect secrecy, while the unpre-
dictable wireless channel is shown to be a good random source.
There is very few work of the joint design of OTP and key genera-
tion from wireless channels. This paper provides a comprehensive
and quantitative investigation on secure transmission achieved
by OTP and wireless channel randomness. We propose two OTP
secure transmission schemes, i.e., Identical Key-based Physical-
layer Secure Transmission (IK-PST) and Un-identical Key-based
Physical-layer Secure Transmission (UK-PST). We quantitatively
analyze the performance of both schemes and prove that UK-
PST outperforms IK-PST. We extend the pairwise schemes to a
group of users in networks with star and chain topologies. We
implement prototypes of both schemes and evaluate the proposed
schemes through both simulations and experiments. The results
verify that UK-PST has a higher effective secret transmission
rate than that of IK-PST for scenarios with both pairwise and
group users.
Index Terms—One time pad; secret key generation; physical-
layer security; information reconciliation; group key distribution.
I. INTRODUCTION
Information security has become the subject of scrutiny
after a number of notorious cyberattacks [1], [2]. Actually,
it has been taken into account as early as the communications
technologies were born. Venman proposed one time pad (OTP)
in 1919, which encrypts each message bit with a different key
bit via exclusive OR (XOR) [3]. In 1949, Shannon mathemat-
ically proved that OTP can achieve information-theoretically
security [4], i.e., perfect secrecy can be obtained even against
adversaries with infinite computational power. While OTP is
able to provide perfect secrecy, its application is rather limited
probably because the secure and efficient provision of keys
for OTP is challenging. The OTP secure transmission system
requires one-time pre-shared random key which has at least the
This work was supported in part by the National Natural Science Foundation
of China under Grant 61801115 and 61941115, in part by the Zhishan Youth
Scholar Program of SEU, the Research Fund of National Mobile Com-
munications Research Laboratory, Southeast University (No.2019B01) and
the Fundamental Research Funds for the Central Universities (3204009415,
3209019405), in part by the Campus France PHC Cai Yuanpei 2019 project
under Grant 44016XA, in part by the China Scholarship Council, and in part
by the Purple Mountain Laboratory Network and Communication Security.
(Corresponding author: G. Li)
G. Li and Z. Zhang are with the School of Cyber Science and Engineering,
Southeast University, Nanjing, China. (e-mail: guyuelee@seu.edu.cn.)
A. Hu is with the School of Information Science and Engineering, Southeast
University, Nanjing, 210096, China. (e-mail: aqhu@seu.edu.cn.)
G. Li and A. Hu are also with the Purple Mountain Laboratories for
Network and Communication Security, Nanjing, 210096, China.
J. Zhang is with the Department of Electrical Engineering and Electronics,
University of Liverpool, Liverpool, L69 3GJ, United Kingdom. (email:
junqing.zhang@liverpool.ac.uk.)
same length as the plaintext message being sent. Therefore, the
realization of the OTP relies on the provision of secure keys.
Our communication and computer networks are currently
protected by modern cryptography including public key cryp-
tography and symmetric encryption [5]. Even though they are
very mature, there are some concerns when quantum computer
becomes available in the future. Public key cryptography
relies on complicated mathematical problems such as discrete
logarithm that is not scalable, which may be cracked by the
quantum computer [6]. Therefore, this paper will revisit OTP
which should be secure against quantum computer.
In 1993, Ahlswede et al. and Maurer published their seminal
work of secret key agreement from common randomness [7],
[8], which is an ideal candidate for generating symmetric keys
for OTP. Their pioneer work has triggered extensive investi-
gation to exploit the randomness residing in the reciprocal
wireless channel [9], [10]. Various practical key generation
approaches have been proposed and verified on platforms with
a variety of wireless techniques, e.g., ZigBee [11], WiFi [12],
[13] and LoRa [14], [15]. In practice, key generation is subject
to impairments of channel measurements due to time delay in
TDD systems, hardware imperfection and noise [16]. Even
when various preprocessing approaches are adopted to im-
prove the similarity between channel characteristics [16] and
quantization algorithms are improved to reduce the disagree-
ments between quantized bit sequences, they cannot guarantee
to produce the same key. Hence, key generation protocol
requires information reconciliation to negotiate an identical
key, which requires parity information exchanged over the
public channel and error correction. The generated key can be
used in any scenarios where common information is required.
For example, it can be used as a seed of a stream cipher for
bootstrapping many higher-layer security mechanisms [10].
Key generation usually works between a pair of legitimate
users, and it is later extended to a group of users with star,
ring and mesh topologies [17]–[21]. This is applicable to
scenarios where some confidential information needs to be
shared among group users. For instance, control centres need
to send confidential instructions to a group of soldiers in
military operations [20].
While most of existing work investigates the key gener-
ation protocols in a given environment, very few of them
focus on the joint design of key generation and OTP. A
straightforward way will be cascading key generation and
OTP, which is termed as Identical Key-based Physical-layer
Secure Transmission (IK-PST). Two connecting wireless users
firstly derive a pair of identical secret key from their channel
observations, and then add each bit of the plaintext to one bit
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from the OTP key using modulo-addition. Producing identical
key requires sophisticated information reconciliation and this
becomes more severe for group users. For example, in the
work of Xu et al. [20], each node pair in the group need to
first generate a nearly uniformly distributed pairwise key with
arbitrarily small error probability. For a ring network with four
users, it needs four times of the information reconciliation.
Liu et al. used some information broadcast, joint with the
observation phase in such a way that the subsequent one-
way public discussion involves merely a single broadcast for
information reconciliation, hence reducing the delay at the
expense of some sacrifice in the key rate [18].
We further think if it is feasible to use the non-reconciled
key for OTP, termed as Un-identical Key-based Physical-
layer Secure Transmission (UK-PST). The challenge is to
decrypt the confidential message correctly when the OTP keys
of two parties are different but highly correlated. We deem
the XOR encryption and decryption modules along with the
physical channel as an equivalent cascade channel. Then, the
tiny differences between keys can be seen as part of the
transmission error, and thus can be corrected by the off-the-
shelf channel coding with a stronger correction capability.
There have been some preliminary explorations on OTP
with un-identical keys. Zheng et al. designed a modified
OTP using keys generated from electrocardiogram signals for
implantable medical devices [22]. There are also efforts from
the wireless community. Peng et al. reused the error correction
capability of Polar codes for the key agreement [23]. It
designed an integrated wireless secret key based transmission
scheme to securing pairwise M2M transmissions, and is shown
to be simpler than the conventional counterpart by avoiding
information reconciliation. Subsequently, the work of [24]
extended the UK-PST scheme to the scenarios with four-node
wireless networks to generate a shared group key.
This joint design can be applied in scenarios requiring
low data rate but high security demands, as an OTP system
can provide incomparable strong security but may be limited
in secure transmission rate. For example, it is necessary to
share the secret spreading/hopping code in spread-spectrum
modulation such as CDMA or fast-frequency hopping [25].
Another potential application is to use the OTP to help
distribute the quantum key from the fixed quantum endpoint
to the mobile endpoints. The implementation of OTP in radio
communication can protect them from disruption attacks.
Although both IK-PST and UK-PST schemes have the
potential to realize the OTP secure transmission, neither of
them has been well investigated yet. IK-PST is easy to
understand, but its practical usage may be compromised by
additional transmissions and information leakage. On the other
hand, UK-PST abandons the information reconciliation and
privacy amplification, but it works at the expense of a stronger
correction capability of the channel coding. Besides, it needs
extra keys to encrypt the syndrome of the confidential data.
This paper aims to provide a comprehensive and quantitative
investigation on secure transmission achieved by OTP and
wireless channel randomness. The main contributions of this
paper are listed as follows.
• We propose two schemes to realize OTP secure trans-
missions using the common randomness from wireless
channels. We found that IK-PST deploys an additional
identical key generation flow while UK-PST simplifies
the secure transmission processes.
• We analyze the performance quantitatively and derive the
closed-form expressions of three metrics, namely com-
munication overhead, computation complexity and secure
transmission rate. We prove that UK-PST outperforms
IK-PST in terms of these metrics.
• We extend the OTP scheme to a group of users in net-
works with star and chain topologies, respectively. UK-
PST does not need to produce identical pairwise keys,
and thus avoids multiple sophisticated information rec-
onciliation and privacy amplification. Therefore, system
complexity and communication overhead are significantly
reduced.
• We implement prototypes of the OTP system with wire-
less motes and evaluate the proposed schemes through
both simulation and experiments. For both pairwise and
group users, UK-PST is verified to achieve higher effec-
tive secret transmission rate than that of IK-PST and the
gap expands with the increase of the disagreement ratio
of channel quantization results. The results coincide with
the theoretical analysis.
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. In Sec-
tion II, we present a detailed system model and attack model.
Section III proposes two OTP secure transmission protocols
named IK-PST and UK-PST for a pair of users. We compare
the performance of the two proposed protocols from the per-
spective of communication overhead, computation complexity
and secure transmission rate in Section IV. Next, we extend
the protocols to group communication networks with star and
chain topologies in Section V. We present the simulation
results and experimental results in Section VI and Section VII
concludes the paper.
Notation and Outline
Unless otherwise specified, we use the following notations
throughout the manuscript: Upper (lower) bold-face letters
denote matrices (column vectors); I denotes the identity ma-
trix. Numeral subscripts of matrices and vectors, if needed,
represent their sizes. Also, matrix superscripts (·)H , (·)T , (·)∗
denote their conjugate-transpose, transpose, and conjugate,
respectively. We use E{·} to denote ensemble expectation and
| · | to represent matrix determinant operations.
II. SYSTEM OVERVIEW
A. System Model
This paper investigated secure transmission achieved by
OTP and key generation. Specifically, a user i intends to
transmit the confidential information to a user j without been
known by a third party. OTP encrypts the plaintext with a
random key at the transmitter via XOR operation, which can
achieve perfect secrecy. The receiver decrypts the message by
XORing the ciphertext with its key. The keys are the same at
transmitter and receiver, which is termed as IK-PST.
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The key distribution for the OTP is challenging. This
paper will employ physical layer key generation from wireless
channels [9]. Key generation is composed of four stages,
namely channel probing, quantization, information reconcilia-
tion and privacy amplification. User i and user j will carry
out bidirectional channel probing between each other, and
they can collect channel measurements, Yj,i(t) and Yi,j(t),
respectively, such as received signal strength (RSS) and chan-
nel state information (CSI). User i and user j collect NT
measurements with a time interval of ∆T , user i will get
yj,i = [Yj,i(1), Yj,i(2), · · · , Yj,i(NT )]T and user j will get
yi,j = [Yi,j(1), Yi,j(2), · · · , Yi,j(NT )]T .
They will then perform quantization individually. For ex-
ample, the mean value-based quantizer can be given as
Q(tk) = Q(Y (tk)) =
{
1, Y (tk) ≥ θ
0, Y (tk) < θ
, (1)
where θ is the mean value of Y (t). Denote qj,i =
[Qj,i(1), Qj,i(2), · · · , Qj,i(NT )]T as the quantized result of
user i. Similarly, qi,j = Q(yi,j) is the quantization results of
user j. The time to produce qj,i and qi,j with length Lq is
T = 2Lq∆T .
It is worth noting that the channel measurements should
be independent, to guarantee the key randomness. In litera-
ture, various methods have been investigated to reduce the
correlation among channel measurements. For example, the
time interval of ∆T is set to exceed the channel coherent
time, so that the adjacent channel measurements are not
correlated [16]. Besides, some down-sampling and correlation
reduction transforms can also be introduced to preprocess
the channel measurements. Previous experiments have verified
that quantization results can pass the random test, with an
appropriate sampling interval or well-designed preprocess-
ing [13], [26]. Therefore, we assume that there is no autocor-
relation within the generated key bits, i.e., qj,i (qi,j). More
work related to the randomness of key generation can be found
in [13], [26].
The channel measurements Yi,j(t) and Yj,t(t) are affected
by the non-simultaneous sampling and noise. This issue results
in un-identical keys, i.e., qi,j and qj,i are not the same. The




‖qi,j − qj,i‖1 , (2)
where ‖·‖1 denotes the 1-norm operator. Information recon-
ciliation is thus used to correct the mismatches, e.g., realized
by employing the error correction code (ECC) [27]. Finally,
privacy amplification is adopted to eliminate any information
leakage during the previous steps.
While it is intuitive to use the same key for encryption
and decryption, OTP with un-identical keys at transmitter and
receiver has not been explored. This is inspired by the fact
that channel coding is employed to correct transmission errors
and the key disagreement can be treated together with the
transmission errors. When keys at the transmitter and receiver
are not the same, the receiver may still be able to correctly
decrypt and decode the message, termed as UK-PST. This
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Fig. 1. Secure transmission using identical pairwise keys.
B. Attack Model
Following the assumptions in most key generation
schemes [16], [28], [29], we also focus on the passive ad-
versary. Besides, we assume the group users are all trusted,
and user compromise and man-in-the-middle attacks are not
considered. The eavesdropper, Eve, is assumed to be located
at least half a wavelength away from legitimate users. Since
wireless channel gains decorrelate over half a wavelength in
multipath environments, Eve’s channel is independent from
that of legitimate users. Therefore, Eve cannot deduce the mea-
surements of legitimate users merely based on her observation.
However, Eve overhears all the public discussion and knows
all the protocols.
III. OTP SECURE TRANSMISSION FOR PAIRWISE USERS
A. IK-PST Protocol
Users i and j firstly generate a string of identical secret
key k and then use it for encrypting and decrypting the
confidential message d. Fig. 1 illustrates the protocol for
secure transmission using reconciled pairwise keys, where qj,i
and qj,i are the quantized results of channel measurements
which are generated according to Section II-A.
The protocol is composed of two stages, namely identical
key generation (from 1-1 to 1-4) and secure transmission (2-1,
2-2). In particular, key generation can be completed as follows.
1-1. User i generates a syndrome s of qj,i by an encoder as
s = E(qj,i), (3)
where E (·) represents the generation function of a
(C, n, k, t) ECC, e.g., BCH.
1-2. Syndrome s is transmitted to user j over a noiseless
public channel, where error-free transmission can be
realized by channel coding. For simplicity, we do not
represent the channel coding process explicitly.
1-3. According to s and qi,j , user j recovers q̂j,i by
q̂j,i = D(qi,j , s), (4)
where D (·) represents the decoding function of the ECC
(C, n, k, t). q̂j,i = qj,i holds when the disagreement ratio
εq is within the capability of (C, n, k, t).
1-4. User i and j perform privacy amplification by feeding
the generated keys into a hash function H(·) as
k = H(q). (5)
Its length Lk = Lq − Ls, where Ls is the length of s.
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Fig. 2. Secure transmission scheme using un-identical keys.
Steps 1-1, 1-2 and 1-3 are for information reconciliation. Eve
can deduce part of qj,i by accessing s, E (·) and D (·).
The rest of the steps are designed for secure transmission.
User i intends to transmit confidential message d to user j over
a public channel securely. Channel coding is used to guarantee
transmission reliability, which is illustrated by the Encoder 0
and Decoder 0 modules as shown in Fig.1.
2-1. The OTP theory uses XOR operation for encrypting the
data, which can be given as
e = d⊕ k, (6)
where ⊕ represents the bitwise XOR operator. The length
of the data d is the same as the length of k, i.e.,
Ld = Lk. (7)
2-2 User i transmits the ciphertext e to user j over a public
channel.
2-3 User j decrypts the message d with his key by
d̂ = e⊕ k = d. (8)
The secure transmission is achieved.
As shown above, IK-PST scheme has a relatively complex
structure to realize OTP secure transmission as it deploys an
additional identical key generation flow.
B. UK-PST Protocol
Fig. 2 illustrates secure transmission using a pair of un-
identical keys, which contains five steps. We also assume qj,i
and qi,j as the quantization results of the channel measure-
ments of user i and j and their lengths are both Lq.
3-1. Private message d′ with a length of Ld′ is first fed into
the channel encoder of user i and the output syndrome is
s′ = E′(d′), (9)
where E′ (·) represents the generation function of a
(C′, n′, k′, t′) ECC.




and encrypted using the key qj,i into the the ciphertext
e′. The bits-stream encryption is realized by
e′ = dcon ⊕ qj,i = [d′ ⊕ qLj,i, s′ ⊕ qRj,i], (11)
where qLj,i is the left Ld′ -bit part and q
R
j,i is the right
Ls′-bit part of qj,i. Therefore, the lengths satisfy that
Lq = Ld′ + Ls′ . (12)
3-3. The ciphertext e′ is transmitted to user j over a public
channel.
3-4. Although user j does not have the identical bit sequence
for decryption, he has qi,j which has a high similarity
with qj,i. User j decrypts e′ with qi,j by
d′con = e
′⊕qi,j = dcon⊕∆ = [d′⊕∆L, s′⊕∆R], (13)
where ∆ = qi,j ⊕ qj,i illustrates the difference between
qi,j and qj,i. When a bit mismatch occurs, the XOR
result becomes ‘1’ in the corresponding position of ∆.
3-5. The user j recovers the confidential message d′ by
d̂′ = D′(d′con) = d
′, (14)
where D′ is the decoding function of the ECC
(C′, n′, k′, t′). Note that, in the practical implementation,
the interleaver and de-interleaver can be exploited to
reduce the impact of burst errors. The elements in d′con
are firstly permuted via an interleaver before the ECC
decoding, and after the ECC decoding, the elements in
d̂′ are also permuted to the original order via a de-
interleaver.
As shown above, UK-PST scheme has a relatively simple
structure to realize OTP secure transmission as it does not
need an additional identical key generation flow.
IV. PERFORMANCE ANALYSIS OF IK-PST AND UK-PST
In this section, we present a contrastive analysis of both
schemes in terms of communication overhead, computation
complexity and secure transmission efficiency.
A. Communication Overhead
Firstly, we consider the communication overhead caused
by the information transmissions from user i to user j. IK-
PST needs two times of the information transmission (step
1-2 and step 2-2) while UK-PST only needs one information
transmission (step 3-3). Following the previous work of [27],
we measure the communication overhead by the interaction
delay Tdelay. The delays for both schemes are calculated as


































respectively, where B is the system bandwidth, dist is the
transmission distance, c is the velocity of light, L0 is the
indispensable overhead in a frame, e.g., the synchronization
header, PHY header and frame payload and T0 = L0/B is





Fig. 3 plots the delays of both schemes as a function of Lq in
a typical ZigBee scenario. The transmission range of ZigBee
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Fig. 3. The communication delays of IK-PST and UK-PST as a function of
the frame overhead L0. The bandwidth B = 1 MHz and dist = 100 meters.
is usually below 100 meters, therefore we set the distance
dist = 100; the bandwidth B = 1 MHz. The propagation
delay is relatively smaller than other terms. According to the
frame format of IEEE 802.15.4 [30], the fixed overhead is
11 bytes and there are 0 to 20 bytes for addresses and frame
payload. As observed from Fig. 3, the delay curves rise with
the increase of length Lq. The delays of UK-PST are smaller
than that of IK-PST, which illustrates that UK-PST can reduce
the communication overhead. The overhead increases linearly
with the rise of Lq. When the overhead L0 is higher, both
schemes have higher delays. When L0 = 31 bytes, the delay
of UK-PST is about half that of IK-PST.
B. Computation Complexity
Computation complexity is very important for resource-
constrained systems. UK-PST does not need the sophisticated
reconciliation phase, and instead uses un-identical binary se-
quences as the encryption and decryption keys. The disagree-
ments between keys will bring in the errors in the recovery
of d. The errors are similar to the transmission errors caused
by transmission distortion. Therefore, we can deem the errors
as part of the equivalent channel errors and couple the error
correction task to the existing channel coding of the system.
The computational complexity is dominated by the decoder
complexity. This paper uses BCH code, as it has been widely
used because of the low complexity. The decoder complexity
bounds for a BCH code (C, n, k, t) can be given as [31]
ζUB(C) = (45k2 + 4k)n2(log n)2, (18)
ζLB(C) = 45k2n2(log n)2. (19)
The IK-PST scheme uses two BCH codes, (C0, n0, k0, t0)
for the physical channel with error probability ε0 and







































Fig. 4. The upper and lower bounds of the decoder complexity of the UK-PST
and IK-PST schemes. The error probability of the channel is ε0 = 0.1.
for approximate calculation of complexity of IK-PST.
The UK-PST scheme uses only one BCH code (C′, n′, k′, t′)
for the cascade channel with εeq [32], given as
εeq = ε0 + εq − 2ε0εq. (22)
When ε0 = 0, we find that εeq = εq and both schemes have





for approximate calculation of complexity of UK-PST.
Fig. 4 shows that the bounds increase with εq and both the
decoder complexity upper bound and lower bound of UK-PST
are lower than that of IK-PST, when the error probability of
the physical channel is ε0 = 0.1.
C. Secure Transmission Rate
The secure transmission rate is defined as the length of
secure transmitted information divided by the time to produce








According to the OTP theory [4], the upper bound of the



















The bound rate is reached through the Slepian-Wolf source
encoding with random binning structure, which is complex
for implementation.
Then, we focus on the secure transmission rates of the IK-
PST and UK-PST schemes.
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IK-PST: In the step 1-1, a (C, n, k, t) ECC is used to
generate a syndrome s. In this case, k = Lq and the length
of s is denoted as Ls = n − k. Besides, the disagreement
ratio εq is within the correction capability of C, which means
that εq ≤ tn . Plugging these components, we get the following
proposition.
Proposition 1: The upper bound of secure transmission rate







Lq − 4εqLq − 1
(1− 2εq)Lq
. (29)
Proof: See Appendix A.
Remark 1: It is observed that RUBIK decreases against the
disagreement ratio εq, while it increases with the length Lq.










UK-PST: In the step 3-1, a (C′, n′, k′, t′) ECC is used to
generate the syndrome s′. In this case, n′ = Lq and the length
of s′ is Ls′ = n′ − k′. Besides, the disagreement ratio εq
is within the correction capability of C′, which means that
εq ≤ t
′
n′ . Plugging these components, we get the following
proposition.
Proposition 2: The upper bound of secure transmission rate










Proof: See Appendix B.
Remark 2: It is observed that RUBUK decreases against the
disagreement ratio εq, while it increases with the length Lq.







We compare these two bounds of the IK-PST and the UK-
PST schemes and prove the following theorem.
Theorem 1: For any εq ∈ [0, 0.5) and Lq > 0, the upper
bounds of secure transmission rates satisfy that
RUBUK ≥ RUBIK . (33)
The ∆R = RUBUK−RUBIK increases with εq. The equality holds,
if and only if εq = 0.
Proof: See Appendix C.
Remark 3: Theorem 1 reveals that UK-PST scheme has
a higher bound of secure transmission rate than that of IK-
PST. In the UK-PST, the s′ is the syndrome of d′ and also
encrypted before transmission over the public channel. In
the IK-PST s is the syndrome of qj,i and transmitted in
cleartext. Therefore, under the same condition, UK-PST is able
to provide higher efficiency for secure transmission. Besides,
C′ has a shorter code length than that of C, which also verifies
that the computation complexity of UK-PST is reduced.
Fig. 5 shows the secure transmission rates of the bounds. We
set ∆T = 1, which means that the secure transmission rate is
calculated per quantization bit. The secure transmission rates













































Fig. 5. The secure transmission rate of IK-PST and UK-PST as a function
of the disagreement ratio εq. The time intervel between two quantization bits
is set as ∆T = 1/2.
decrease with the increase of εq, while the rate of UK-PST is
closer to the bound rate and it is higher than that of IK-PST.
When εq is close to 0.25, the rate of IK-PST falls to 0 which
means no secure transmission is available. While UK-PST can
still provide a positive secure transmission rate.
In summary, UK-PST has lower communication overhead,
lower computation complexity and higher secure transmission
rate compared with IK-PST.
V. OTP SECURE TRANSMISSION FOR A GROUP OF USERS
It is straightforward to extend the IK-PST scheme from
two users to a group of users, which is omitted due to
space limitation. In this section, we extend the pairwise UK-
PST scheme to group users, which contains two phases, i.e.,
pairwise phase and group phase.
• Pairwise phase: pairwise bit sequences with high simi-
larity are extracted from the wireless channels between
every two legitimate users.
• Group phase: a confidential message is securely shared
between group users with protection of pairwise bit
sequences.
Next, we examine two typical topologies in wireless networks
when performing group UK-PST for multiple users.
A. Group UK-PST in a Star Network
In a star network with N users, the central user N is
wirelessly connected with child users, 1, 2, · · · , N − 1, while
every two child nodes are not directly connected. The group
secure transmission protocol is summarized in Algorithm 1.
1) Pairwise Phase: Firstly, the central user N broadcasts
the probe and other users collect the measurements. The mea-
surement of the i-th user is rN,i, where i ∈ {1, 2, · · · , N−1}.
Next, users 1, 2, · · · , N − 1 broadcast the probe in order and
user N collects the measurements ri,N successively. To ensure
that rN,i and ri,N are highly correlated, the time delay should
be deliberately kept smaller than the coherence time.
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Algorithm 1 UK-PST algorithm in a star topology network.
Require: The confidential message d′ at the central user N .
Ensure: The recovered messages d̂i at the user i, where i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , N − 1}.
Pairwise Phase:
1: User N broadcasts the probe and other users collect the
measurements.
2: for i← 1, N − 1 do
3: User i broadcasts the probe, and user N collects the
measurement.
4: end for
5: The center user N carries out quantization according to
(1) and get {q1,N ,q2,N , · · · ,qN−1,N}.
6: The user i carries out quantization according to (1) and
get qN,i.
Group Phase:
7: User N encodes d′ using (9) as described in the protocol
3-1 and gets dcon.
8: User N encrypts dcon with q1,N ,q2,N ,· · · ,qN−1,N suc-
cessively as described in the step 3-2.
9: User N concatenates the ciphertexts and then broadcasts
them via the public channel.
10: for i← 1, N − 1 do
11: User i recovers the confidential message d̂i using his
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Fig. 6. The group secure transmission protocol for the star network.
Secondly, the channel measurements are converted into bit
sequences using the same quantization method as shown in
(1). The pairwise bit sequences qN,i and qi,N have high
similarity but are not identical. Denotes ∆qi = qN,i ⊕ qi,N





‖qN,i − qi,N‖1 , (34)
and εmax = max
i
εqi represents the highest disagreement ratio
among all users.
It is noteworthy that UK-PST does not contain an infor-
mation reconciliation process and thus does not trigger the
information leakage. The bit mismatch will be addressed in the
group phase. The pairwise phase may be repeated for several
times to produce long enough bit sequences with length Lq.
After the pairwise phase, the central user N has collected a
group of sequences q1,N , q2,N , · · · ,qN−1,N . The other users
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N 3,N 2 , q qN-1,N-2
N 2,N 1, q qN,N-1
N 1,Nq
'
2 3,2 con e q d
'
3 4,3 con e q d
'
N 2 N 1,N 2 con   e q d
'
N 1 N,N 1 con  e q d
..
.
Fig. 7. The group secure transmission protocol for the chain network.
2) Group Phase: User N feeds the message d′ into the
channel encoder and the syndrome is denoted as s′ = E(d′).
The concatenation dcon = [d′, s′] is encrypted and the
ciphertexts are denoted as e′ = [e′1, e
′
2, · · · , e′N−1], where
e′i = dcon ⊕ qi,N . (35)
User N broadcasts the ciphertext e′ over the public channel.
Assume that the broadcast information can be received without
any errors, which can be realized through the channel coding.
The user i has the corresponding pairwise bit sequence qN,i
and can speculate dcon by
d̂icon = e
′
i ⊕ qN,i = ∆qi ⊕ dcon. (36)
With the help of the syndrome s, user i can correct the error




To guarantee d̂i = d′ for arbitrary i, the syndrome s should
be capable to correct all errors even in the worst case with the
highest disagreement ratio of εmax.
B. Group UK-PST in a Chain Network
In a chain network, users are connected sequentially and
communications only occur between adjacent users, as shown
in Fig. 11. Algorithm 2 gives an algorithm of UK-PST for a
chain network with N users.
1) Pairwise Phase: Users 1 ∼ N sound the channel in
turn. First, user 1 broadcasts the probe packets and user 2
obtains the measurements r1,2. Next, user j (2 ≤ j ≤ N − 1)
broadcasts, and users j−1 and j+1 obtain their measurements
rj,j−1 and rj,j+1, respectively. Finally, user N broadcasts and
user N − 1 obtains the measurements rN,N−1.
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Algorithm 2 UK-PST algorithm in a chain topology network.
Require: The confidential message d′ at the central user N .
Ensure: The recovered messages d̂i at the user i, where i ∈
{1, 2, · · · , N − 1}.
Pairwise Phase:
1: Users 1 ∼ N send the probe packets to their adjacent
users and collect the measurements.
2: All of the users carry out quantization according to (1).
Group Phase:
3: User 1 encodes d′ using (9) as described in the step 3-
1and gets dcon.
4: User 1 sends the encrpypted result e′1 to user 2.
5: for i← 2, N − 1 do
6: User i recovers messages d̂i and then broadcasts e′i.
7: end for
8: User N recovers messages d̂N .
These measurements are converted into bit sequences, as
described in (1). After the pairwise phase, user j has two bit
sequences qj−1,j and qj+1,j . For endpoint users 1 and N ,
each has one bit sequence, q2,1 and qN−1,N respectively.
2) Group Phase: User 1 firstly encodes d′ and then broad-
casts the ciphertext e′1, which is obtained by
e′1 = q2,1 ⊕ dcon = q2,1 ⊕ [d′, s′], (38)
where s′ is the syndrome of d′. We also assume that e1 can be
received correctly. Since user 2 has the corresponding pairwise
bit sequence q1,2, therefore he can speculate d′ and s′ by
d̂2con = q1,2 ⊕ e′1 = ∆q1,2 ⊕ dcon, (39)
where ∆q1,2 = q1,2 ⊕ q2,1 reflects the difference between
q1,2 and q2,1.




Subsequently, the bit sequences q2,1 is recovered by:
q̂2,1 = [d̂2,E(d̂2)]⊕ e′1, (41)
When ∆q1,2 is within the error correction capability of the
decoder, user 2 can get perfect estimations of d′ and q2,1 that
d̂2 = d
′, q̂2,1 = q2,1. (42)
Next, user 2 encrypts dcon with q3,2 and broadcasts e′2 =
q3,2⊕dcon. User 3 recovers d using his pairwise bit sequence
q2,3 and then broadcasts
e′3 = q4,3 ⊕ dcon, (43)
and so on. Finally, user N − 1 broadcasts
e′N−1 = qN,N−1 ⊕ dcon, (44)
and user N recovers data d̂N with qN−1,N . When
∆qN−1,N = qN−1,N ⊕qN,N−1 is within the error correction
capability of the ECC, user N can recover d̂N = d correctly.
TABLE I
PERFORMANCE COMPARATION FOR GROUP SCENARIOS
Performance IK-PST UK-PST
Transmissions Star Chain Star Chain
2N 3N-2 N + 1 2N-1










Table I compares the performance of IK-PST and UK-
PST for group scenarios from the aspects of the number of
transmissions, the number of information reconciliation and
the secure transmission rate.
In a star network, IK-PST needs 2N transmissions, includ-
ing N channel probing, N − 1 information reconciliation and
one data transmission. UK-PST reduces it to N +1, including
N channel probing and one data transmission. Similarly, in a
chain network, IK-PST needs 3N−2 transmissions, including
N channel probing, N−1 information reconciliation and N−1
data transmission. UK-PST reduces it to 2N −1, including N
channel probing and N − 1 data transmission.
In both star and chain networks, UK-PST does not need
to produce the identical pairwise key, and thus avoids so-
phisticated information reconciliation. This is at the cost of
a stronger channel coding to correct an equivalent error rate
of εeq = ε0 + εmax − 2ε0εmax. Following (29) and (31), the
















VI. SIMULATION AND EXPERIMENTAL VALIDATION
This section evaluated the performance of the IK-PST and
UK-PST schemes through both simulations and experiments.
A. Simulations
Monte-Carlo simulation was carried out to evaluate the
system performance. We did 1,000 loops per simulation, each
loop with more than 10,000 bits. The quantization results
between every two pairwise users were modeled as random
distributed binary sequences with the disagreement ratio εq.
In both schemes, the BCH code (C, n, k, t) is chosen and the
parameters of n and k are designed according to εq and t. For
example, when t = 1 and εq = 0.02, the length of n must not
exceed t/εq = 50. Otherwise, it does not have the capability
to correct all of the disagreements. Since the code length of
BCH should satisfies that n = 2m−1,m ∈ {3, 4, · · · , 16}, we
can choose m = 5 and use the (31, 26, 1) BCH code, unless
otherwise specified.
We define effective secure transmission rate as
Reff = R(1− ηf ), (47)
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Fig. 8. Performance of effective secure transmission rates and upper bounds
versus εq for a pair of users.
where R is the secure transmission rate defined in Section IV-C
and ηf represents the probability of failure. Due to the inaccu-
rate estimation of εq and burst errors, the designed BCH code
cannot always correct all the disagreements. Therefore, we
also take the failure ratio ηf into consideration. For simplicity,
the time interval between two quantization bits is set as
∆T = 1/2, we can thus omit it in the calculation of secure




(1− ηf ). (48)
Fig. 8 and Fig. 9 present effective secure transmission rates
of IK-PST and UK-PST as a function of the disagreement
ratio of εq for a pair of users. Following (29) and (31), the
analytical upper bounds of both rates RUBIK and R
UB
UK are
also shown in Fig. 8 as a reference. As expected, the rates
decrease with εq and the rates decrease much faster for the
IK-PST scheme. The simulation curves have the same trends
with that of the upper bounds, which verify the theoretical
analysis in Section IV-C. Although εq increases continuously,
the rate curves have stepwise decline, caused by the limitation
of available BCH codes. We also find that the effective secure
transmission rates over εq follow similar decreasing trend
despite of the different set of t, as shown in Fig. 9. For
t = 1, 2, 3, the rates of UK-PST are higher than that of IK-PST,
and the gaps expand with the increase of εq. When t increases,
the effective secure transmission rates decrease, because more
percentage of parity bits are used. Therefore, we choose t = 1
for the following simulations.
Fig. 10 and Fig. 11 compare the effective secure transmis-
sion rates of IK-PST and UK-PST versus the user number in
a star network and a chain network, respectively. We set that
all of the users in the group have the same disagreement ratio
εq. We simulate two cases of εq = 0.05 and εq = 0.1 and set
t = 1. Group simulation results also indicate that UK-PST has
higher effective secure transmission rate than that of IK-PST.
When εq = 0.05, RUK is about 1.15 times as much as RIK ,
while the multiple becomes larger than 2, when εq = 0.1.


















































Fig. 9. Performance of effective secure transmission rate versus εq for a pair
of users with different t.



















































Fig. 10. Performance of effective secure transmission rate versus the user
number in a star network, t = 1.
Besides, in both figures, the effective secure transmission rates
decrease with the group size. For example, when εq = 0.1,
RIK drops from 0.25 with two users to 0.1 with five users and
to 0.05 with ten users. The results reflect the inverse relation
between the rate and group size, which is consistent with the
expressions of upperbound in (45) and (46).
B. Experiments
We also verified the robustness and efficiency of IK-PST and
UK-PST using a testbed with wireless motes. A wireless mote
includes a STM8L101 micro-controller, a built-in antenna and
a CC1101 radio chip operating at 430 MHz. We implemented
half-duplex TDD for a pair of users, and used the probe
packet to fulfill our needs to collect RSS measurements. We
conducted experiments at the place around the No. 6 building
of the Chinese Network Valley, Nanjing, China.
The experiments were carried out in three typical environ-
ments, including indoor, outdoor and corridor, as shown in
Fig. 12. For the same environment, we also measured RSS
10



















































Fig. 11. Performance of effective secure transmission rate versus the user







Fig. 12. Three experimental environments.
TABLE II
EXPERIMENT SCENARIOS
No. Environment Pedestrians Distance LoS/NLoS Dataset
1 Indoor Without 1.5 m LoS 10
2 Indoor Without 1.5 m NLoS 10
3 Indoor With 4.5 m NLoS 10
4 Corridor Without 3.5 m LoS 10
5 Corridor With 3.5 m LoS 10
6 Outdoor Without 3.5 m LoS 10
under different conditions, i.e., with or without pedestrians
passing through, line of sight (LoS) and non line of sight
(NLoS), and the communication distance between the two
motes. These setups were categorized in six scenarios as
listed in Table. II. For each scenario, we did ten independent
tests between two wireless motes and 255 RSS measurements
were collected in each test. The RSS measurements were
quantized into bit sequences using order-1 quantization method
as described in (1).
Fig. 13 shows the effective secure transmission rate of IK-
PST and UK-PST under various scenarios. The disagreement
ratio εq is also plotted for reference. It is observed that


















































Fig. 13. Effective secure transmission rate under various scenarios.
Fig. 14. Experiment platform with multiple wireless motes.
the rates are negatively correlated with εq. Scenario three
achieves the highest εq due to the longest distance of 4.5
meters, and thus the rates in this scenarios are lower. Different
from the simulation, we cannot generate data with the set
εq in the experiments. Therefore, the estimation of εq is not
accurate, which may result in failure of correction. From the
experimental results, RUK is higher than RIK for all six
scenarios. In the scenario one, RUK and RIK are 0.9821
and 0.9824, respectively. Due to the small value of εq in this
scenario, both rates are close to 1 and the gap is small. In
other scenarios with higher εq, such as the scenario three, the
gap becomes significant.
We also verified the performance against a group of users
with the platform shown in Fig. 14. Fig. 15 and Fig. 16 show
the effective secure transmission rate versus the user number
in a star and chain network, respectively. As expected, both
rates fall with the increase of the user number. From Fig. 15,
RUK is almost twice as much as RIK for two users, and the
multiple reduces to 1.5 with six users. In Fig. 16, RUK is
about 1.15 times as much as RIK . The results show that the
UK-PST schemes can provide higher secure transmission rate
for a group of users with both star and chain topologies.
11
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Fig. 15. Effective secure transmission rate versus the user number in a star
network, t = 1.
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Fig. 16. Effective secure transmission rate versus the user number in a chain
network, t = 1.
VII. CONCLUSION
This paper investigated the OTP secure transmission by
exploiting the randomness residing in the reciprocal wireless
channel. We proposed two approaches, IK-PST and UK-PST.
IK-PST uses the same pairwise key at both ends while UK-
PST employs un-identical keys. Although IK-PST is intuitive
to understand, its performances are inferior to UK-PST from
the perspective of communication overhead, computation com-
plexity and secure transmission rate. The performance gap
expands when both schemes are extended to a group of users.
We conducted simulations and implemented prototypes of the
two schemes. Both simulation and experimental results show
that UK-PST can achieve higher effective secret transmission
rate than that of IK-PST and the gap expands with the increase
of the disagreement ratio of channel quantization results,
which verify the theoretical analysis.
APPENDIX A
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 1
For the ECC (C, n, k, t), it should satisfies that n − k ≥
2t+ 1, which indicates that
Ls = n− k ≥ 2t+ 1. (49)






k + 2t+ 1
, (50)
which means that
t ≥ εq(1 + Lq)
1− 2εq
. (51)
Futher, we can derive that





Ld ≤ Lq − Ls =
Lq − 4εqLq − 1
1− 2εq
. (53)
Therefore, the upper bound of the secure transmission rate of











PROOF OF PROPOSITION 2
For the ECC (C′, n′, k′, t′), it should satisfies that n′−k′ ≥
2t′ + 1, which indicates that
k′ = Ld′ , n
′ = Lq. (55)













Futher, we can derive that
Ls′ ≥ 2t′ + 1 = 2εqLq + 1, (58)
and
Ld′ ≤ Lq − Ls′ = Lq(1− 2εq)− 1. (59)
Therefore, the upper bound of the secure transmission rate of












PROOF OF THEOREM 1


























Since εq ∈ [0, 0.5) and Lq > 0, we can get RUBUK −RUBIK ≥ 0




= −2 + 2(1 + Lq)
Lq(1− 2εq)
> 0 (62)
Therefore, the gap of ∆R = RUBUK −RUBIK increases with εq.
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